[v3,0/1] implement TLS register based stack canary for ARM
Message ID | 20211026081836.3518758-1-ardb@kernel.org |
---|---|
Headers |
Return-Path: <gcc-patches-bounces+patchwork=sourceware.org@gcc.gnu.org> X-Original-To: patchwork@sourceware.org Delivered-To: patchwork@sourceware.org Received: from server2.sourceware.org (localhost [IPv6:::1]) by sourceware.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D6BDF385840D for <patchwork@sourceware.org>; Tue, 26 Oct 2021 08:19:19 +0000 (GMT) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 sourceware.org D6BDF385840D DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gcc.gnu.org; s=default; t=1635236359; bh=dn4HMKJg88tDI1B36QC3vb9MD+RsMgNAB6iv+n8YkYA=; h=To:Subject:Date:List-Id:List-Unsubscribe:List-Archive:List-Post: List-Help:List-Subscribe:From:Reply-To:Cc:From; b=MT2WY+xM6CB2pCneW0Q9DpP4WUxLrF5tpojtibeOqmhDS9i0GVVEqNPkarUS4ljoS gURQkYZMb2EzAVlJeQFp2Ne5hRw+/hSpyr78gNNzG8pPqYGFFYdrH0LWmbsuiQZ77X ITE92ntfKxyYz/ciYHf6nE4F82Htj63tMNbSdduk= X-Original-To: gcc-patches@gcc.gnu.org Delivered-To: gcc-patches@gcc.gnu.org Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by sourceware.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6F5F23858D3C for <gcc-patches@gcc.gnu.org>; Tue, 26 Oct 2021 08:18:50 +0000 (GMT) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.4.1 sourceware.org 6F5F23858D3C Received: by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 8D8646058D; Tue, 26 Oct 2021 08:18:46 +0000 (UTC) To: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v3 0/1] implement TLS register based stack canary for ARM Date: Tue, 26 Oct 2021 10:18:35 +0200 Message-Id: <20211026081836.3518758-1-ardb@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.30.2 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.9 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00, DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID, DKIM_VALID_AU, DKIM_VALID_EF, KAM_SHORT, SPF_HELO_NONE, SPF_PASS, TXREP autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.4 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.4 (2020-01-24) on server2.sourceware.org X-BeenThere: gcc-patches@gcc.gnu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Gcc-patches mailing list <gcc-patches.gcc.gnu.org> List-Unsubscribe: <https://gcc.gnu.org/mailman/options/gcc-patches>, <mailto:gcc-patches-request@gcc.gnu.org?subject=unsubscribe> List-Archive: <https://gcc.gnu.org/pipermail/gcc-patches/> List-Post: <mailto:gcc-patches@gcc.gnu.org> List-Help: <mailto:gcc-patches-request@gcc.gnu.org?subject=help> List-Subscribe: <https://gcc.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/gcc-patches>, <mailto:gcc-patches-request@gcc.gnu.org?subject=subscribe> From: Ard Biesheuvel via Gcc-patches <gcc-patches@gcc.gnu.org> Reply-To: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Cc: keescook@chromium.org, Richard Sandiford <richard.sandiford@arm.com>, thomas.preudhomme@celest.fr, Keith Packard <keithpac@amazon.com>, gcc-patches@gcc.gnu.org, Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Errors-To: gcc-patches-bounces+patchwork=sourceware.org@gcc.gnu.org Sender: "Gcc-patches" <gcc-patches-bounces+patchwork=sourceware.org@gcc.gnu.org> |
Message
Ard Biesheuvel
Oct. 26, 2021, 8:18 a.m. UTC
Bugzilla: https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=102352 In the Linux kernel, user processes calling into the kernel are essentially threads running in the same address space, of a program that never terminates. This means that using a global variable for the stack protector canary value is problematic on SMP systems, as we can never change it unless we reboot the system. (Processes that sleep for any reason will do so on a call into the kernel, which means that there will always be live kernel stack frames carrying copies of the canary taken when the function was entered) AArch64 implements -mstack-protector-guard=sysreg for this purpose, as this permits the kernel to use different memory addresses for the stack canary for each CPU, and context switch the chosen system register with the rest of the process, allowing each process to use its own unique value for the stack canary. This patch implements something similar, but for the 32-bit ARM kernel, which will start using the user space TLS register TPIDRURO to index per-process metadata while running in the kernel. This means we can just add an offset to TPIDRURO to obtain the address from which to load the canary value. As for the spilling issues that have been fixed in this code in the past: I suppose a register carrying the TLS register value will never get spilled to begin with? Changes since v2: - fix the template for stack_protect_test_tls so it correctly conveys the fact that it sets the Z flag Comments/suggestions welcome. Cc: Keith Packard <keithpac@amazon.com> Cc: thomas.preudhomme@celest.fr Cc: adhemerval.zanella@linaro.org Cc: Qing Zhao <qing.zhao@oracle.com> Cc: Richard Sandiford <richard.sandiford@arm.com> Cc: gcc-patches@gcc.gnu.org Ard Biesheuvel (1): [ARM] Add support for TLS register based stack protector canary access gcc/config/arm/arm-opts.h | 6 ++ gcc/config/arm/arm-protos.h | 2 + gcc/config/arm/arm.c | 52 ++++++++++++++++ gcc/config/arm/arm.md | 62 +++++++++++++++++++- gcc/config/arm/arm.opt | 22 +++++++ gcc/doc/invoke.texi | 9 +++ 6 files changed, 151 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)