Commit Message
We had a request from a customer to fix CVE-2017-9778 (aka PR
gdb/21600). They don't really care about this particular bug, just that
they can cross it off the list of known vulnerabilities in GDB.
This patch is based on the one attached to the issue. I also cleaned up
a bunch of pointless conversions between signed and unsigned
representations of the length field, and made sure the length == 0 case
retains its special meaning.
OK to commit?
-Sandra
Comments
On Wed, 24 Apr 2019 10:27:39 -0600
Sandra Loosemore <sandra@codesourcery.com> wrote:
> GDB was failing to catch cases where a corrupt ELF or core file
> contained an invalid length value in a Dwarf debug frame FDE header.
> It was checking for buffer overflow but not cases where the length was
> negative or caused pointer wrap-around.
>
> In addition to the additional validity check, this patch cleans up the
> multiple signed/unsigned conversions on the length field so that an
> unsigned representation is used consistently throughout.
>
> 2019-04-24 Sandra Loosemore <sandra@codesourcery.com>
> Kang Li <kanglictf@gmail.com>
>
> PR gdb/21600
>
> * dwarf2-frame.c (read_initial_length): Be consistent about using
> unsigned representation of length.
> (decode_frame_entry_1): Likewise. Check for wraparound of
> end pointer as well as buffer overflow.
This is okay.
Kevin
On 2019-04-24 20:56, Kevin Buettner wrote:
> On Wed, 24 Apr 2019 10:27:39 -0600
> Sandra Loosemore <sandra@codesourcery.com> wrote:
>
>> GDB was failing to catch cases where a corrupt ELF or core file
>> contained an invalid length value in a Dwarf debug frame FDE
>> header.
>> It was checking for buffer overflow but not cases where the length
>> was
>> negative or caused pointer wrap-around.
>>
>> In addition to the additional validity check, this patch cleans up
>> the
>> multiple signed/unsigned conversions on the length field so that
>> an
>> unsigned representation is used consistently throughout.
>>
>> 2019-04-24 Sandra Loosemore <sandra@codesourcery.com>
>> Kang Li <kanglictf@gmail.com>
>>
>> PR gdb/21600
>>
>> * dwarf2-frame.c (read_initial_length): Be consistent about using
>> unsigned representation of length.
>> (decode_frame_entry_1): Likewise. Check for wraparound of
>> end pointer as well as buffer overflow.
>
> This is okay.
>
> Kevin
I would just suggest using a more descriptive commit title, stating what
the commit actually changes in the code. It's still good to reference
the CVE number, but by itself is not very descriptive.
Thanks,
Simon
On 4/24/19 9:25 PM, Simon Marchi wrote:
> On 2019-04-24 20:56, Kevin Buettner wrote:
>> On Wed, 24 Apr 2019 10:27:39 -0600
>> Sandra Loosemore <sandra@codesourcery.com> wrote:
>>
>>> GDB was failing to catch cases where a corrupt ELF or core file
>>> contained an invalid length value in a Dwarf debug frame FDE header.
>>> It was checking for buffer overflow but not cases where the
>>> length was
>>> negative or caused pointer wrap-around.
>>>
>>> In addition to the additional validity check, this patch cleans
>>> up the
>>> multiple signed/unsigned conversions on the length field so that an
>>> unsigned representation is used consistently throughout.
>>>
>>> 2019-04-24 Sandra Loosemore <sandra@codesourcery.com>
>>> Kang Li <kanglictf@gmail.com>
>>>
>>> PR gdb/21600
>>>
>>> * dwarf2-frame.c (read_initial_length): Be consistent about
>>> using
>>> unsigned representation of length.
>>> (decode_frame_entry_1): Likewise. Check for wraparound of
>>> end pointer as well as buffer overflow.
>>
>> This is okay.
>>
>> Kevin
>
> I would just suggest using a more descriptive commit title, stating what
> the commit actually changes in the code. It's still good to reference
> the CVE number, but by itself is not very descriptive.
Done. I pushed it as "Detect invalid length field in debug frame FDE
header."
-Sandra
On Wed, 24 Apr 2019 23:25:45 -0400
Simon Marchi <simon.marchi@polymtl.ca> wrote:
> On 2019-04-24 20:56, Kevin Buettner wrote:
> > On Wed, 24 Apr 2019 10:27:39 -0600
> > Sandra Loosemore <sandra@codesourcery.com> wrote:
> >
> >> GDB was failing to catch cases where a corrupt ELF or core file
> >> contained an invalid length value in a Dwarf debug frame FDE
> >> header.
> >> It was checking for buffer overflow but not cases where the length
> >> was
> >> negative or caused pointer wrap-around.
> >>
> >> In addition to the additional validity check, this patch cleans up
> >> the
> >> multiple signed/unsigned conversions on the length field so that
> >> an
> >> unsigned representation is used consistently throughout.
> >>
> >> 2019-04-24 Sandra Loosemore <sandra@codesourcery.com>
> >> Kang Li <kanglictf@gmail.com>
> >>
> >> PR gdb/21600
> >>
> >> * dwarf2-frame.c (read_initial_length): Be consistent about using
> >> unsigned representation of length.
> >> (decode_frame_entry_1): Likewise. Check for wraparound of
> >> end pointer as well as buffer overflow.
> >
> > This is okay.
> >
> > Kevin
>
> I would just suggest using a more descriptive commit title, stating what
> the commit actually changes in the code. It's still good to reference
> the CVE number, but by itself is not very descriptive.
Yes, good point.
I'm glad that Sandra saw your suggestion prior to pushing that commit.
Kevin
commit 30d251c35871b0e8aff16d60df3db3d327e34bfa
Author: Sandra Loosemore <sandra@codesourcery.com>
Date: Wed Apr 24 08:53:26 2019 -0700
Fix CVE-2017-9778.
GDB was failing to catch cases where a corrupt ELF or core file
contained an invalid length value in a Dwarf debug frame FDE header.
It was checking for buffer overflow but not cases where the length was
negative or caused pointer wrap-around.
In addition to the additional validity check, this patch cleans up the
multiple signed/unsigned conversions on the length field so that an
unsigned representation is used consistently throughout.
2019-04-24 Sandra Loosemore <sandra@codesourcery.com>
Kang Li <kanglictf@gmail.com>
PR gdb/21600
* dwarf2-frame.c (read_initial_length): Be consistent about using
unsigned representation of length.
(decode_frame_entry_1): Likewise. Check for wraparound of
end pointer as well as buffer overflow.
@@ -1,3 +1,13 @@
+2019-04-24 Sandra Loosemore <sandra@codesourcery.com>
+ Kang Li <kanglictf@gmail.com>
+
+ PR gdb/21600
+
+ * dwarf2-frame.c (read_initial_length): Be consistent about using
+ unsigned representation of length.
+ (decode_frame_entry_1): Likewise. Check for wraparound of
+ end pointer as well as buffer overflow.
+
2019-04-23 Andrew Burgess <andrew.burgess@embecosm.com>
* s12z-tdep.c (s12z_unwind_pc): Delete.
@@ -1487,7 +1487,7 @@ static ULONGEST
read_initial_length (bfd *abfd, const gdb_byte *buf,
unsigned int *bytes_read_ptr)
{
- LONGEST result;
+ ULONGEST result;
result = bfd_get_32 (abfd, buf);
if (result == 0xffffffff)
@@ -1788,7 +1788,7 @@ decode_frame_entry_1 (struct comp_unit *unit, const gdb_byte *start,
{
struct gdbarch *gdbarch = get_objfile_arch (unit->objfile);
const gdb_byte *buf, *end;
- LONGEST length;
+ ULONGEST length;
unsigned int bytes_read;
int dwarf64_p;
ULONGEST cie_id;
@@ -1799,15 +1799,15 @@ decode_frame_entry_1 (struct comp_unit *unit, const gdb_byte *start,
buf = start;
length = read_initial_length (unit->abfd, buf, &bytes_read);
buf += bytes_read;
- end = buf + length;
-
- /* Are we still within the section? */
- if (end > unit->dwarf_frame_buffer + unit->dwarf_frame_size)
- return NULL;
+ end = buf + (size_t) length;
if (length == 0)
return end;
+ /* Are we still within the section? */
+ if (end <= buf || end > unit->dwarf_frame_buffer + unit->dwarf_frame_size)
+ return NULL;
+
/* Distinguish between 32 and 64-bit encoded frame info. */
dwarf64_p = (bytes_read == 12);