diff mbox

[3/4] Revise crypt.texi.

Message ID 20180521173853.5172-4-zackw@panix.com
State Committed
Headers show

Commit Message

Zack Weinberg May 21, 2018, 5:38 p.m. UTC
This is a major rewrite of the description of 'crypt', 'getentropy',
and 'getrandom'.

A few highlights of the content changes:

 - Throughout the manual, public headers, and user-visible messages,
   I replaced the term "password" with "passphrase", the term
   "password database" with "user database", and the term
   "encrypt(ion)" with "(one-way) hashing" whenever it was applied to
   passphrases.  I didn't bother making this change in internal code
   or tests.  The use of the term "password" in ruserpass.c survives,
   because that refers to a keyword in netrc files, but it is adjusted
   to make this clearer.

   There is a note in crypt.texi explaining that they were
   traditionally called passwords but single words are not good enough
   anymore, and a note in users.texi explaining that actual passphrase
   hashes are found in a "shadow" database nowadays.

 - There is a new short introduction to the "Cryptographic Functions"
   section, explaining how we do not intend to be a general-purpose
   cryptography library, and cautioning that there _are_, or have
   been, legal restrictions on the use of cryptography in many
   countries, without getting into any kind of detail that we can't
   promise to keep up to date.

 - I added more detail about what a "one-way function" is, and why
   they are used to obscure passphrases for storage.  I removed the
   paragraph saying that systems not connected to a network need no
   user authentication, because that's a pretty rare situation
   nowadays.  (It still says "sometimes it is necessary" to
   authenticate the user, though.)

 - I added documentation for all of the hash functions that glibc
   actually supports, but not for the additional hash functions
   supported by libxcrypt.  If we're going to keep this manual section
   around after the transition is more advanced, it would probably
   make sense to add them then.

 - There is much more detailed discussion of how to generate a salt,
   and the failure behavior for crypt is documented.  (Returning an
   invalid hash on failure is what libxcrypt does; Solar Designer's
   notes say that this was done "for compatibility with old programs
   that assume crypt can never fail".)

 - As far as I can tell, the header 'crypt.h' is entirely a GNU
   invention, and never existed on any other Unix lineage.  The
   function 'crypt', however, was in Issue 1 of the SVID and is now
   in the XSI component of POSIX.  I tried to make all of the
   @standards annotations consistent with this, but I'm not sure I got
   them perfectly right.

 - The genpass.c example has been improved to use getentropy instead
   of the current time to generate the salt, and to use a SHA-256 hash
   instead of MD5. It uses more random bytes than is strictly
   necessary because I didn't want to complicate the code with proper
   base64 encoding.

 - The testpass.c example has three hardwired hashes now, to
   demonstrate that different one-way functions produce different
   hashes for the same input.  It also demonstrates how DES hashing
   only pays attention to the first eight characters of the input.

 - There is new text explaining in more detail how a CSPRNG differs
   from a regular random number generator, and how
   getentropy/getrandom are not exactly a CSPRNG.  I tried not to make
   specific falsifiable claims here.  I also tried to make the
   blocking/cancellation/error behavior of both getentropy and
   getrandom clearer.

        * crypt/crypt.h, posix/unistd.h: Update comments and
        prototypes for crypt and crypt_r.

	* manual/crypt.texi (Cryptographic Functions): New initial
	exposition.
	(crypt): Section renamed to 'Passphrase Storage'.  Full rewrite.
      	(Unpredictable Bytes): Improve initial exposition.  Clarify error
	behavior of getentropy and getrandom.
	* manual/examples/genpass.c: Generate a salt using getentropy
	instead of the current time. Use hash $5$ (SHA-2-256).
	* manual/examples/testpass.c: Demonstrate validation against
	hashes generated with three different one-way functions.

        * manual/intro.texi: crypt.texi does not need an overview
	anymore.

        * manual/nss.texi, manual/memory.texi, manual/socket.texi
        * manual/terminal.texi: Consistently refer to "passphrases"
        * instead of "passwords", and to the "user database" instead
        * of the "password database".
        * manual/users.texi: Similarly.  Add notes about how actual
        passphrase hashes are now stored in the shadow database.
        Remove 20-year-old junk todo note.
---
 crypt/crypt.h               |  21 +-
 inet/ruserpass.c            |   2 +-
 manual/contrib.texi         |   2 +-
 manual/crypt.texi           | 391 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
 manual/examples/genpass.c   |  44 ++--
 manual/examples/mygetpass.c |   4 +-
 manual/examples/testpass.c  |  52 +++--
 manual/intro.texi           |   1 -
 manual/memory.texi          |   2 +-
 manual/nss.texi             |  12 +-
 manual/socket.texi          |   4 +-
 manual/terminal.texi        |  14 +-
 manual/users.texi           |  22 +-
 nscd/pwdcache.c             |   4 +-
 posix/unistd.h              |  10 +-
 pwd/pwd.h                   |  29 +--
 shadow/shadow.h             |  16 +-
 17 files changed, 401 insertions(+), 229 deletions(-)

Comments

Rical Jasan May 25, 2018, 2:52 a.m. UTC | #1
On 05/21/2018 10:38 AM, Zack Weinberg wrote:
...
> diff --git a/crypt/crypt.h b/crypt/crypt.h
...
> diff --git a/inet/ruserpass.c b/inet/ruserpass.c
...
> diff --git a/manual/contrib.texi b/manual/contrib.texi
...
> diff --git a/manual/crypt.texi b/manual/crypt.texi
...

I have no comments or complaints on anything up to this point.

> @@ -123,93 +202,120 @@ for a password and prints ``Access granted.'' if the user types
>  
>  @node Unpredictable Bytes
>  @section Generating Unpredictable Bytes
> -
> -Some cryptographic applications (such as session key generation) need
> -unpredictable bytes.
> -
> -In general, application code should use a deterministic random bit
> -generator, which could call the @code{getentropy} function described
> -below internally to obtain randomness to seed the generator.  The
> -@code{getrandom} function is intended for low-level applications which
> -need additional control over the blocking behavior.
> +@cindex randomness source
> +@cindex random numbers, cryptographic
> +@cindex pseudo-random numbers, cryptographic
> +@cindex cryptographic random number generator
> +@cindex deterministic random bit generator
> +@cindex CRNG
> +@cindex CSPRNG
> +@cindex DRBG
> +
> +Cryptographic applications often need some random data that will be as
> +difficult as possible for a hostile eavesdropper to guess.  For
> +instance, encryption keys should be chosen at random, and the ``salt''
> +strings used by @code{crypt} (@pxref{Passphrase Storage}) should also
> +be chosen at random.
> +
> +The pseudo-random number generators described in @ref{Pseudo-Random
> +Numbers} are not unpredictable enough for these applications.  They

@ref will still render with the "see" verb in some formats, so it's
generally a bad choice.  Maybe:

Some pseudo-random number generators do not provide unpredictable-enough
output for cryptographic applications; @pxref{Pseudo-Random Numbers}.
Such applications...

> +need to use a @dfn{cryptographic random number generator} (CRNG), also
> +sometimes called a @dfn{cryptographically strong pseudo-random number
> +generator} (CSPRNG) or @dfn{deterministic random bit generator} (DRBG).
> +
> +Currently, @theglibc{} does not provide a cryptographic random number
> +generator.  What it does provide is functions that read random data

"are functions"

> +from a @dfn{randomness source} supplied by the operating system.  The
> +randomness source is a CRNG at heart, but it also also continually

Double "also".

> +``re-seeds'' itself from physical sources of randomness, such as
> +electronic noise and clock jitter.  This means applications do not
> +need to do anything to ensure that the random numbers it produces are
> +different on each run.
> +
> +The catch, however, is that these functions will only produce
> +relatively short random strings in any one call.  Often this is not a
> +problem, but applications that need more than a few kilobytes of
> +cryptographically strong random data should call these functions once
> +and use their output to seed a CRNG.
> +
> +Most applications should use @code{getentropy}.  The @code{getrandom}
> +function is intended for low-level applications which need additional
> +control over blocking behavior.
>  
>  @deftypefun int getentropy (void *@var{buffer}, size_t @var{length})
>  @standards{GNU, sys/random.h}
>  @safety{@mtsafe{}@assafe{}@acsafe{}}
>  
> -This function writes @var{length} bytes of random data to the array
> -starting at @var{buffer}, which must be at most 256 bytes long.  The
> -function returns zero on success.  On failure, it returns @code{-1} and
> -@code{errno} is updated accordingly.
> -
> -The @code{getentropy} function is declared in the header file
> -@file{sys/random.h}.  It is derived from OpenBSD.
> -
> -The @code{getentropy} function is not a cancellation point.  A call to
> -@code{getentropy} can block if the system has just booted and the kernel
> -entropy pool has not yet been initialized.  In this case, the function
> -will keep blocking even if a signal arrives, and return only after the
> -entropy pool has been initialized.
> -
> -The @code{getentropy} function can fail with several errors, some of
> -which are listed below.
> +This function writes exactly @var{length} bytes of random data to the
> +array starting at @var{buffer}.  @var{length} can be no more than 256.
> +On success, it returns zero.  On failure, it returns @math{-1}, and
> +@code{errno} is set to indicate the problem.  Some of the possible
> +errors are listed below.
>  
>  @table @code
>  @item ENOSYS
> -The kernel does not implement the required system call.
> +The operating system does not implement a randomness source, or does
> +not support this way of accessing it.  (For instance, the system call
> +used by this function was added to the Linux kernel in version 3.17.)

I'm not sure if I'm missing a (possibly not so) subtle point here, but I
feel like this is more words to say the same thing.  What other ways of
accessing an operating system's (as opposed to the kernel's) source of
randomness would glibc take advantage of?  It kind of sounds like we're
not doing due diligence in that light.  I could just be reading this
wrong, though.

>  @item EFAULT
>  The combination of @var{buffer} and @var{length} arguments specifies
>  an invalid memory range.
>  
>  @item EIO
> -More than 256 bytes of randomness have been requested, or the buffer
> -could not be overwritten with random data for an unspecified reason.
> -
> +@var{length} is larger than 256, or the kernel entropy pool has
> +suffered a catastrophic failure.

Someone else may need to comment on this.  The original version leaves
it pretty wide open as to why one would get EIO.  Is it really only just
because LENGTH was greater than 256 or there was a problem in a specific
subsystem of the kernel?  If so, then OK.

I do appreciate that this would be the first use of "catastrophic
failure" in an errno description.  :)

>  @end table
>  
> +A call to @code{getentropy} can only block when the system has just
> +booted and the randomness source has not yet been initialized.
> +However, if it does block, it cannot be interrupted by signals or
> +thread cancellation.  Programs intended to run in very early stages of
> +the boot process may need to use @code{getrandom} in non-blocking mode
> +instead, and be prepared to cope with random data not being available
> +at all.

Good.

> +The @code{getentropy} function is declared in the header file
> +@file{sys/random.h}.  It is derived from OpenBSD.

Should the @standards be adjusted?  If this isn't purely a GNU
extension, I think credit should be given where credit's due.  Does BSD
declare it in sys/random.h?

>  @end deftypefun
>  
>  @deftypefun ssize_t getrandom (void *@var{buffer}, size_t @var{length}, unsigned int @var{flags})
>  @standards{GNU, sys/random.h}
>  @safety{@mtsafe{}@assafe{}@acsafe{}}
>  
> -This function writes @var{length} bytes of random data to the array
> -starting at @var{buffer}.  On success, this function returns the number
> -of bytes which have been written to the buffer (which can be less than
> -@var{length}).  On error, @code{-1} is returned, and @code{errno} is
> -updated accordingly.
> -
> -The @code{getrandom} function is declared in the header file
> -@file{sys/random.h}.  It is a GNU extension.
> -
> -The following flags are defined for the @var{flags} argument:
> +This function writes up to @var{length} bytes of random data to the
> +array starting at @var{buffer}.  The @var{flags} argument should be
> +either zero, or the bitwise OR of some of the following flags:
>  
>  @table @code
>  @item GRND_RANDOM
> -Use the @file{/dev/random} (blocking) pool instead of the
> -@file{/dev/urandom} (non-blocking) pool to obtain randomness.  If the
> -@code{GRND_RANDOM} flag is specified, the @code{getrandom} function can
> -block even after the randomness source has been initialized.
> +Use the @file{/dev/random} (blocking) source instead of the
> +@file{/dev/urandom} (non-blocking) source to obtain randomness.

Referring to the (entropy) "pool" seems more natural in this context;
did you change it to "source" strictly for consistency?  OK either way,
but it's noticeable.

> +If this flag is specified, the call may block, potentially for quite
> +some time.  If it is not specified, the call can only block when the
> +system has just booted and the randomness source has not yet been
> +initialized.

I think the prior information that using this flag can cause the call to
block "even after the randomness source has been initialized" is
valuable.  It's more to the point, IMO, as it directly addresses the use
of this flag.  (Though without a GRND_URANDOM flag, it is fair to
address the non-use of this flag here, which I see you pulled from below.)

>  @item GRND_NONBLOCK
>  Instead of blocking, return to the caller immediately if no data is
>  available.
>  @end table
>  
> -The @code{getrandom} function is a cancellation point.
> +Unlike @code{getentropy}, the @code{getrandom} function is a
> +cancellation point, and if it blocks, it can be interrupted by
> +signals.

Good.

> -Obtaining randomness from the @file{/dev/urandom} pool (i.e., a call
> -without the @code{GRND_RANDOM} flag) can block if the system has just
> -booted and the pool has not yet been initialized.

(Moved to GRND_RANDOM discussion.)  OK.  Otherwise, I would have
considered moving it earlier in the description, but it would be
difficult to avoid disrupting the flow leading to the flags discussion.

> -The @code{getrandom} function can fail with several errors, some of
> -which are listed below.  In addition, the function may not fill the
> -buffer completely and return a value less than @var{length}.
> +On success, @code{getrandom} returns the number of bytes which have
> +been written to the buffer, which may be less than @var{length}.  On
> +error, it returns @math{-1}, and @code{errno} is set to indicate the
> +problem.  Some of the possible errors are:

I like the way you used "up to LENGTH" earlier, and moved the
conversation about return values here without being redundant.

>  @table @code
>  @item ENOSYS
> -The kernel does not implement the @code{getrandom} system call.
> +The operating system does not implement a randomness source, or does
> +not support this way of accessing it.  (For instance, the system call
> +used by this function was added to the Linux kernel in version 3.17.)

(See comments on ENOSYS for getentropy.)

>  @item EAGAIN
>  No random data was available and @code{GRND_NONBLOCK} was specified in
> @@ -228,4 +334,7 @@ the kernel randomness pool is initialized, this can happen even if
>  The @var{flags} argument contains an invalid combination of flags.
>  @end table
>  
> +The @code{getrandom} function is declared in the header file
> +@file{sys/random.h}.  It is a GNU extension.
> +
>  @end deftypefun

Good, moving this to the bottom of the description, which is where this
information is typically located.

Does the extra blank line make a noticeable improvement in the rendered
output?  (Some places in the manual have @comments saying to preserve
them for that reason.)

> diff --git a/manual/examples/genpass.c b/manual/examples/genpass.c

...

I don't have time to review the examples right now, and there's even
more after that, so I'll try to finish this over the weekend.  It's a
pretty heavy rewrite.  So far, there have been a few things I don't
think needed to be so heavily rewritten, but it's quality.  :)  So far,
so good.

Rical
Florian Weimer June 25, 2018, 12:21 p.m. UTC | #2
On 05/25/2018 04:52 AM, Rical Jasan wrote:
> On 05/21/2018 10:38 AM, Zack Weinberg wrote:
> ...
>> diff --git a/crypt/crypt.h b/crypt/crypt.h
> ...
>> diff --git a/inet/ruserpass.c b/inet/ruserpass.c
> ...
>> diff --git a/manual/contrib.texi b/manual/contrib.texi
> ...
>> diff --git a/manual/crypt.texi b/manual/crypt.texi
> ...
> 
> I have no comments or complaints on anything up to this point.
> 
>> @@ -123,93 +202,120 @@ for a password and prints ``Access granted.'' if the user types
>>   
>>   @node Unpredictable Bytes
>>   @section Generating Unpredictable Bytes
>> -
>> -Some cryptographic applications (such as session key generation) need
>> -unpredictable bytes.
>> -
>> -In general, application code should use a deterministic random bit
>> -generator, which could call the @code{getentropy} function described
>> -below internally to obtain randomness to seed the generator.  The
>> -@code{getrandom} function is intended for low-level applications which
>> -need additional control over the blocking behavior.
>> +@cindex randomness source
>> +@cindex random numbers, cryptographic
>> +@cindex pseudo-random numbers, cryptographic
>> +@cindex cryptographic random number generator
>> +@cindex deterministic random bit generator
>> +@cindex CRNG
>> +@cindex CSPRNG
>> +@cindex DRBG
>> +
>> +Cryptographic applications often need some random data that will be as
>> +difficult as possible for a hostile eavesdropper to guess.  For
>> +instance, encryption keys should be chosen at random, and the ``salt''
>> +strings used by @code{crypt} (@pxref{Passphrase Storage}) should also
>> +be chosen at random.
>> +
>> +The pseudo-random number generators described in @ref{Pseudo-Random
>> +Numbers} are not unpredictable enough for these applications.  They
> 
> @ref will still render with the "see" verb in some formats, so it's
> generally a bad choice.  Maybe:
> 
> Some pseudo-random number generators do not provide unpredictable-enough
> output for cryptographic applications; @pxref{Pseudo-Random Numbers}.
> Such applications...

Thanks, applied.

>> +need to use a @dfn{cryptographic random number generator} (CRNG), also
>> +sometimes called a @dfn{cryptographically strong pseudo-random number
>> +generator} (CSPRNG) or @dfn{deterministic random bit generator} (DRBG).
>> +
>> +Currently, @theglibc{} does not provide a cryptographic random number
>> +generator.  What it does provide is functions that read random data
> 
> "are functions"

I'm going to use this:

“
Currently, @theglibc{} does not provide a cryptographic random number
generator, but it does provide functions that read random data
from a @dfn{randomness source} supplied by the operating system.  The
”

>> +from a @dfn{randomness source} supplied by the operating system.  The
>> +randomness source is a CRNG at heart, but it also also continually
> 
> Double "also".

Fixed.

>>   @table @code
>>   @item ENOSYS
>> -The kernel does not implement the required system call.
>> +The operating system does not implement a randomness source, or does
>> +not support this way of accessing it.  (For instance, the system call
>> +used by this function was added to the Linux kernel in version 3.17.)
> 
> I'm not sure if I'm missing a (possibly not so) subtle point here, but I
> feel like this is more words to say the same thing.  What other ways of
> accessing an operating system's (as opposed to the kernel's) source of
> randomness would glibc take advantage of?  It kind of sounds like we're
> not doing due diligence in that light.  I could just be reading this
> wrong, though.

I think it's about covering the Hurd, which does not have kernel support 
for getrandom.  But I don't feel strongly about this.

> 
>>   @item EFAULT
>>   The combination of @var{buffer} and @var{length} arguments specifies
>>   an invalid memory range.
>>   
>>   @item EIO
>> -More than 256 bytes of randomness have been requested, or the buffer
>> -could not be overwritten with random data for an unspecified reason.
>> -
>> +@var{length} is larger than 256, or the kernel entropy pool has
>> +suffered a catastrophic failure.
> 
> Someone else may need to comment on this.  The original version leaves
> it pretty wide open as to why one would get EIO.  Is it really only just
> because LENGTH was greater than 256 or there was a problem in a specific
> subsystem of the kernel?  If so, then OK.
> 
> I do appreciate that this would be the first use of "catastrophic
> failure" in an errno description.  :)

I think both versions are okay.  I expect that Zack looked at the kernel 
sources here.

>> +The @code{getentropy} function is declared in the header file
>> +@file{sys/random.h}.  It is derived from OpenBSD.
> 
> Should the @standards be adjusted?  If this isn't purely a GNU
> extension, I think credit should be given where credit's due.

Well, we already give credit to OpenBSD here.

> Does BSD declare it in sys/random.h?

No, that header was pioneered by Solaris.

>>   @table @code
>>   @item GRND_RANDOM
>> -Use the @file{/dev/random} (blocking) pool instead of the
>> -@file{/dev/urandom} (non-blocking) pool to obtain randomness.  If the
>> -@code{GRND_RANDOM} flag is specified, the @code{getrandom} function can
>> -block even after the randomness source has been initialized.
>> +Use the @file{/dev/random} (blocking) source instead of the
>> +@file{/dev/urandom} (non-blocking) source to obtain randomness.
> 
> Referring to the (entropy) "pool" seems more natural in this context;
> did you change it to "source" strictly for consistency?  OK either way,
> but it's noticeable.

I think “source” is more useful to the casual reader who doesn't know 
about implementation strategies for CSPRNGs.

>> +If this flag is specified, the call may block, potentially for quite
>> +some time.  If it is not specified, the call can only block when the
>> +system has just booted and the randomness source has not yet been
>> +initialized.
> 
> I think the prior information that using this flag can cause the call to
> block "even after the randomness source has been initialized" is
> valuable.

Agreed, this is critical information.  I'm going with this:

“
If this flag is specified, the call may block, potentially for quite
some time, even after the randomness source has been initialized.  If it
is not specified, the call can only block when the system has just
booted and the randomness source has not yet been initialized.
”

>> +The @code{getrandom} function is declared in the header file
>> +@file{sys/random.h}.  It is a GNU extension.
>> +
>>   @end deftypefun
> 
> Good, moving this to the bottom of the description, which is where this
> information is typically located.
> 
> Does the extra blank line make a noticeable improvement in the rendered
> output?  (Some places in the manual have @comments saying to preserve
> them for that reason.)

I think current makeinfo is way less sensitive about input whitespace 
then it used to be.  The blank line does not survive into HTML and Info 
output (but the latter is difficult to tell because there's no text 
after it in the node).

Thanks,
Florian
Florian Weimer June 25, 2018, 12:26 p.m. UTC | #3
On 05/21/2018 07:38 PM, Zack Weinberg wrote:
> --- a/manual/users.texi
> +++ b/manual/users.texi
> @@ -1722,7 +1722,6 @@ members.  Older systems do not even have the @code{ut_host} member.
>   @node User Database
>   @section User Database
>   @cindex user database
> -@cindex password database
>   @pindex /etc/passwd

I'm going to preserve the reference to “password database” because there 
is a paragraph that explains this historic usage.

Thanks,
Florian
diff mbox

Patch

diff --git a/crypt/crypt.h b/crypt/crypt.h
index 3cb18de14d..ebe8607452 100644
--- a/crypt/crypt.h
+++ b/crypt/crypt.h
@@ -28,13 +28,18 @@ 
 
 __BEGIN_DECLS
 
-/* Encrypt at most 8 characters from KEY using salt to perturb DES.  */
-extern char *crypt (const char *__key, const char *__salt)
+/* One-way hash PHRASE, returning a string suitable for storage in the
+   user database.  SALT selects the one-way function to use, and
+   ensures that no two users' hashes are the same, even if they use
+   the same passphrase.  The return value points to static storage
+   which will be overwritten by the next call to crypt.  */
+extern char *crypt (const char *__phrase, const char *__salt)
      __THROW __nonnull ((1, 2));
 
 #ifdef __USE_GNU
-/* Reentrant version of 'crypt'.  The additional argument
-   points to a structure where the results are placed in.  */
+
+/* This structure provides scratch and output buffers for 'crypt_r'.
+   Its contents should not be accessed directly.  */
 struct crypt_data
   {
     char keysched[16 * 8];
@@ -49,7 +54,13 @@  struct crypt_data
     int  direction, initialized;
   };
 
-extern char *crypt_r (const char *__key, const char *__salt,
+/* Thread-safe version of 'crypt'.
+   DATA must point to a 'struct crypt_data' allocated by the caller.
+   Before the first call to 'crypt_r' with a new 'struct crypt_data',
+   that object must be initialized to all zeroes.  The pointer
+   returned, if not NULL, will point within DATA.  (It will still be
+   overwritten by the next call to 'crypt_r' with the same DATA.)  */
+extern char *crypt_r (const char *__phrase, const char *__salt,
 		      struct crypt_data * __restrict __data)
      __THROW __nonnull ((1, 2, 3));
 #endif
diff --git a/inet/ruserpass.c b/inet/ruserpass.c
index 5b2747bc50..4fa6520c1a 100644
--- a/inet/ruserpass.c
+++ b/inet/ruserpass.c
@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@  next:
 			    fstat64(fileno(cfile), &stb) >= 0 &&
 			    (stb.st_mode & 077) != 0) {
 	warnx(_("Error: .netrc file is readable by others."));
-	warnx(_("Remove password or make file unreadable by others."));
+	warnx(_("Remove 'password' line or make file unreadable by others."));
 				goto bad;
 			}
 			if (token() && *apass == 0) {
diff --git a/manual/contrib.texi b/manual/contrib.texi
index dd28e9293b..6191f46f31 100644
--- a/manual/contrib.texi
+++ b/manual/contrib.texi
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@  Martin Galvan for contributing gdb pretty printer support to glibc and adding
 an initial set of pretty printers for structures in the POSIX Threads library.
 
 @item
-Michael Glad for the DES encryption function @code{crypt} and related
+Michael Glad for the passphrase-hashing function @code{crypt} and related
 functions.
 
 @item
diff --git a/manual/crypt.texi b/manual/crypt.texi
index 0f04ee9899..500649b4fc 100644
--- a/manual/crypt.texi
+++ b/manual/crypt.texi
@@ -1,121 +1,200 @@ 
 @node Cryptographic Functions, Debugging Support, System Configuration, Top
 @chapter Cryptographic Functions
-@c %MENU% Password storage and strongly unpredictable bytes
+@c %MENU% Passphrase storage and strongly unpredictable bytes.
+
+@Theglibc{} includes only a few special-purpose cryptographic
+functions: one-way hash functions for passphrase storage, and access
+to a cryptographic randomness source, if one is provided by the
+operating system.  Programs that need general-purpose cryptography
+should use a dedicated cryptography library, such as
+@uref{https://www.gnu.org/software/libgcrypt/,,libgcrypt}.
+
+Many countries place legal restrictions on the import, export,
+possession, or use of cryptographic software.  We deplore these
+restrictions, but we must still warn you that @theglibc{} may be
+subject to them, even if you do not use the functions in this chapter
+yourself.  The restrictions vary from place to place and are changed
+often, so we cannot give any more specific advice than this warning.
 
 @menu
-* crypt::                       A one-way function for passwords.
-* Unpredictable Bytes::         Randomness for cryptography purposes.
+* Passphrase Storage::          One-way hashing for passphrases.
+* Unpredictable Bytes::         Randomness for cryptographic purposes.
 @end menu
 
-@node crypt
-@section Encrypting Passwords
+@node Passphrase Storage
+@section Passphrase Storage
+@cindex passphrase hashing
+@cindex one-way hashing
+@cindex hashing, passphrase
 
-On many systems, it is unnecessary to have any kind of user
-authentication; for instance, a workstation which is not connected to a
-network probably does not need any user authentication, because to use
-the machine an intruder must have physical access.
-
-Sometimes, however, it is necessary to be sure that a user is authorized
+Sometimes it is necessary to be sure that a user is authorized
 to use some service a machine provides---for instance, to log in as a
 particular user id (@pxref{Users and Groups}).  One traditional way of
-doing this is for each user to choose a secret @dfn{password}; then, the
-system can ask someone claiming to be a user what the user's password
-is, and if the person gives the correct password then the system can
-grant the appropriate privileges.
-
-If all the passwords are just stored in a file somewhere, then this file
-has to be very carefully protected.  To avoid this, passwords are run
-through a @dfn{one-way function}, a function which makes it difficult to
-work out what its input was by looking at its output, before storing in
-the file.
-
-@Theglibc{} provides a one-way function that is compatible with
-the behavior of the @code{crypt} function introduced in FreeBSD 2.0.
-It supports two one-way algorithms: one based on the MD5
-message-digest algorithm that is compatible with modern BSD systems,
-and the other based on the Data Encryption Standard (DES) that is
-compatible with Unix systems.
-
-@deftypefun {char *} crypt (const char *@var{key}, const char *@var{salt})
-@standards{BSD, crypt.h}
-@standards{SVID, crypt.h}
+doing this is for each user to choose a secret @dfn{passphrase}; then, the
+system can ask someone claiming to be a user what the user's passphrase
+is, and if the person gives the correct passphrase then the system can
+grant the appropriate privileges.  (Traditionally, these were called
+``passwords,'' but nowadays a single word is too easy to guess.)
+
+Programs that handle passphrases must take special care not to reveal
+them to anyone, no matter what.  It is not enough to keep them in a
+file that is only accessible with special privileges.  The file might
+be ``leaked'' via a bug or misconfiguration, and system administrators
+shouldn't learn everyone's passphrase even if they have to edit that
+file for some reason.  To avoid this, passphrases should also be
+converted into @dfn{one-way hashes}, using a @dfn{one-way function},
+before they are stored.
+
+A one-way function is easy to compute, but there is no known way to
+compute its inverse.  This means the system can easily check
+passphrases, by hashing them and comparing the result with the stored
+hash.  But an attacker who discovers someone's passphrase hash can
+only discover the passphrase it corresponds to by guessing and
+checking.  The one-way functions are designed to make this process
+impractically slow, for all but the most obvious guesses.  (Do not use
+a word from the dictionary as your passphrase.)
+
+@Theglibc{} provides an interface to four one-way functions, based on
+the SHA-2-512, SHA-2-256, MD5, and DES cryptographic primitives.  New
+passphrases should be hashed with either of the SHA-based functions.
+The others are too weak for newly set passphrases, but we continue to
+support them for verifying old passphrases.  The DES-based hash is
+especially weak, because it ignores all but the first eight characters
+of its input.
+
+@deftypefun {char *} crypt (const char *@var{phrase}, const char *@var{salt})
+@standards{X/Open, unistd.h}
+@standards{GNU, crypt.h}
 @safety{@prelim{}@mtunsafe{@mtasurace{:crypt}}@asunsafe{@asucorrupt{} @asulock{} @ascuheap{} @ascudlopen{}}@acunsafe{@aculock{} @acsmem{}}}
 @c Besides the obvious problem of returning a pointer into static
 @c storage, the DES initializer takes an internal lock with the usual
-@c set of problems for AS- and AC-Safety.  The FIPS mode checker and the
-@c NSS implementations of may leak file descriptors if canceled.  The
+@c set of problems for AS- and AC-Safety.
+@c The NSS implementations may leak file descriptors if cancelled.
 @c The MD5, SHA256 and SHA512 implementations will malloc on long keys,
 @c and NSS relies on dlopening, which brings about another can of worms.
 
-The @code{crypt} function takes a password, @var{key}, as a string, and
-a @var{salt} character array which is described below, and returns a
-printable ASCII string which starts with another salt.  It is believed
-that, given the output of the function, the best way to find a @var{key}
-that will produce that output is to guess values of @var{key} until the
-original value of @var{key} is found.
-
-The @var{salt} parameter does two things.  Firstly, it selects which
-algorithm is used, the MD5-based one or the DES-based one.  Secondly, it
-makes life harder for someone trying to guess passwords against a file
-containing many passwords; without a @var{salt}, an intruder can make a
-guess, run @code{crypt} on it once, and compare the result with all the
-passwords.  With a @var{salt}, the intruder must run @code{crypt} once
-for each different salt.
-
-For the MD5-based algorithm, the @var{salt} should consist of the string
-@code{$1$}, followed by up to 8 characters, terminated by either
-another @code{$} or the end of the string.  The result of @code{crypt}
-will be the @var{salt}, followed by a @code{$} if the salt didn't end
-with one, followed by 22 characters from the alphabet
-@code{./0-9A-Za-z}, up to 34 characters total.  Every character in the
-@var{key} is significant.
-
-For the DES-based algorithm, the @var{salt} should consist of two
-characters from the alphabet @code{./0-9A-Za-z}, and the result of
-@code{crypt} will be those two characters followed by 11 more from the
-same alphabet, 13 in total.  Only the first 8 characters in the
-@var{key} are significant.
-
-The MD5-based algorithm has no limit on the useful length of the
-password used, and is slightly more secure.  It is therefore preferred
-over the DES-based algorithm.
-
-When the user enters their password for the first time, the @var{salt}
-should be set to a new string which is reasonably random.  To verify a
-password against the result of a previous call to @code{crypt}, pass
-the result of the previous call as the @var{salt}.
+The function @code{crypt} converts a passphrase string, @var{phrase},
+into a one-way hash suitable for storage in the user database.  The
+string that it returns will consist entirely of printable ASCII
+characters.  It will not contain whitespace, nor any of the characters
+@samp{:}, @samp{;}, @samp{*}, @samp{!}, or @samp{\}.
+
+The @var{salt} parameter controls which one-way function is used, and
+it also ensures that the output of the one-way function is different
+for every user, even if they have the same passphrase.  This makes it
+harder to guess passphrases from a large user database.  Without salt,
+the attacker could make a guess, run @code{crypt} on it once, and
+compare the result with all the hashes.  Salt forces the attacker to
+make separate calls to @code{crypt} for each user.
+
+To verify a passphrase, pass the previously hashed passphrase as the
+@var{salt}.  To hash a new passphrase for storage, set @var{salt} to a
+string consisting of a prefix plus a sequence of randomly chosen
+characters, according to this table:
+
+@multitable @columnfractions .2 .1 .3
+@headitem One-way function @tab Prefix @tab Random sequence
+@item SHA-2-512
+@tab @samp{$6$}
+@tab 16 characters
+@item SHA-2-256
+@tab @samp{$5$}
+@tab 16 characters
+@item MD5
+@tab @samp{$1$}
+@tab 8 characters
+@item DES
+@tab @samp{}
+@tab 2 characters
+@end multitable
+
+In all cases, the random characters should be chosen from the alphabet
+@code{./0-9A-Za-z}.
+
+With all of the hash functions @emph{except} DES, @var{phrase} can be
+arbitrarily long, and all eight bits of each byte are significant.
+With DES, only the first eight characters of @var{phrase} affect the
+output, and the eighth bit of each byte is also ignored.
+
+@code{crypt} can fail.  Some implementations return @code{NULL} on
+failure, and others return an @emph{invalid} hashed passphrase, which
+will begin with a @samp{*} and will not be the same as @var{salt}.  In
+either case, @code{errno} will be set to indicate the problem.  Some
+of the possible error codes are:
+
+@table @code
+@item EINVAL
+@var{salt} is invalid; neither a previously hashed passphrase, nor a
+well-formed new salt for any of the supported hash functions.
+
+@item EPERM
+The system configuration forbids use of the hash function selected by
+@var{salt}.
+
+@item ENOMEM
+Failed to allocate internal scratch storage.
+
+@item ENOSYS
+@itemx EOPNOTSUPP
+Hashing passphrases is not supported at all, or the hash function
+selected by @var{salt} is not supported.  @Theglibc{} does not use
+these error codes, but they may be encountered on other operating
+systems.
+@end table
+
+@code{crypt} uses static storage for both internal scratchwork and the
+string it returns.  It is not safe to call @code{crypt} from multiple
+threads simultaneously, and the string it returns will be overwritten
+by any subsequent call to @code{crypt}.
+
+@code{crypt} is specified in the X/Open Portability Guide and is
+present on nearly all historical Unix systems.  However, the XPG does
+not specify any one-way functions.
+
+@code{crypt} is declared in @file{unistd.h}.  @Theglibc{} also
+declares this function in @file{crypt.h}.
 @end deftypefun
 
-@deftypefun {char *} crypt_r (const char *@var{key}, const char *@var{salt}, {struct crypt_data *} @var{data})
+@deftypefun {char *} crypt_r (const char *@var{phrase}, const char *@var{salt}, struct crypt_data *@var{data})
 @standards{GNU, crypt.h}
 @safety{@prelim{}@mtsafe{}@asunsafe{@asucorrupt{} @asulock{} @ascuheap{} @ascudlopen{}}@acunsafe{@aculock{} @acsmem{}}}
+@tindex struct crypt_data
 @c Compared with crypt, this function fixes the @mtasurace:crypt
 @c problem, but nothing else.
 
-The @code{crypt_r} function does the same thing as @code{crypt}, but
-takes an extra parameter which includes space for its result (among
-other things), so it can be reentrant.  @code{data@w{->}initialized} must be
-cleared to zero before the first time @code{crypt_r} is called.
-
-The @code{crypt_r} function is a GNU extension.
+The function @code{crypt_r} is a thread-safe version of @code{crypt}.
+Instead of static storage, it uses the memory pointed to by its
+@var{data} argument for both scratchwork and the string it returns.
+It can safely be used from multiple threads, as long as different
+@var{data} objects are used in each thread.  The string it returns
+will still be overwritten by another call with the same @var{data}.
+
+@var{data} must point to a @code{struct crypt_data} object allocated
+by the caller.  All of the fields of @code{struct crypt_data} are
+private, but before one of these objects is used for the first time,
+it must be initialized to all zeroes, using @code{memset} or similar.
+After that, it can be reused for many calls to @code{crypt_r} without
+erasing it again.  @code{struct crypt_data} is very large, so it is
+best to allocate it with @code{malloc} rather than as a local
+variable.  @xref{Memory Allocation}.
+
+@code{crypt_r} is a GNU extension.  It is declared in @file{crypt.h},
+as is @code{struct crypt_data}.
 @end deftypefun
 
-The @code{crypt} and @code{crypt_r} functions are prototyped in the
-header @file{crypt.h}.
-
-The following short program is an example of how to use @code{crypt} the
-first time a password is entered.  Note that the @var{salt} generation
-is just barely acceptable; in particular, it is not unique between
-machines, and in many applications it would not be acceptable to let an
-attacker know what time the user's password was last set.
+The following program shows how to use @code{crypt} the first time a
+passphrase is entered.  It uses @code{getentropy} to make the salt as
+unpredictable as possible; @pxref{Unpredictable Bytes}.
 
 @smallexample
 @include genpass.c.texi
 @end smallexample
 
-The next program shows how to verify a password.  It prompts the user
-for a password and prints ``Access granted.'' if the user types
-@code{GNU libc manual}.
+The next program demonstrates how to verify a passphrase.  It checks a
+hash hardcoded into the program, because looking up real users' hashed
+passphrases may require special privileges (@pxref{User Database}).
+It also shows that different one-way functions produce different
+hashes for the same passphrase.
 
 @smallexample
 @include testpass.c.texi
@@ -123,93 +202,120 @@  for a password and prints ``Access granted.'' if the user types
 
 @node Unpredictable Bytes
 @section Generating Unpredictable Bytes
-
-Some cryptographic applications (such as session key generation) need
-unpredictable bytes.
-
-In general, application code should use a deterministic random bit
-generator, which could call the @code{getentropy} function described
-below internally to obtain randomness to seed the generator.  The
-@code{getrandom} function is intended for low-level applications which
-need additional control over the blocking behavior.
+@cindex randomness source
+@cindex random numbers, cryptographic
+@cindex pseudo-random numbers, cryptographic
+@cindex cryptographic random number generator
+@cindex deterministic random bit generator
+@cindex CRNG
+@cindex CSPRNG
+@cindex DRBG
+
+Cryptographic applications often need some random data that will be as
+difficult as possible for a hostile eavesdropper to guess.  For
+instance, encryption keys should be chosen at random, and the ``salt''
+strings used by @code{crypt} (@pxref{Passphrase Storage}) should also
+be chosen at random.
+
+The pseudo-random number generators described in @ref{Pseudo-Random
+Numbers} are not unpredictable enough for these applications.  They
+need to use a @dfn{cryptographic random number generator} (CRNG), also
+sometimes called a @dfn{cryptographically strong pseudo-random number
+generator} (CSPRNG) or @dfn{deterministic random bit generator} (DRBG).
+
+Currently, @theglibc{} does not provide a cryptographic random number
+generator.  What it does provide is functions that read random data
+from a @dfn{randomness source} supplied by the operating system.  The
+randomness source is a CRNG at heart, but it also also continually
+``re-seeds'' itself from physical sources of randomness, such as
+electronic noise and clock jitter.  This means applications do not
+need to do anything to ensure that the random numbers it produces are
+different on each run.
+
+The catch, however, is that these functions will only produce
+relatively short random strings in any one call.  Often this is not a
+problem, but applications that need more than a few kilobytes of
+cryptographically strong random data should call these functions once
+and use their output to seed a CRNG.
+
+Most applications should use @code{getentropy}.  The @code{getrandom}
+function is intended for low-level applications which need additional
+control over blocking behavior.
 
 @deftypefun int getentropy (void *@var{buffer}, size_t @var{length})
 @standards{GNU, sys/random.h}
 @safety{@mtsafe{}@assafe{}@acsafe{}}
 
-This function writes @var{length} bytes of random data to the array
-starting at @var{buffer}, which must be at most 256 bytes long.  The
-function returns zero on success.  On failure, it returns @code{-1} and
-@code{errno} is updated accordingly.
-
-The @code{getentropy} function is declared in the header file
-@file{sys/random.h}.  It is derived from OpenBSD.
-
-The @code{getentropy} function is not a cancellation point.  A call to
-@code{getentropy} can block if the system has just booted and the kernel
-entropy pool has not yet been initialized.  In this case, the function
-will keep blocking even if a signal arrives, and return only after the
-entropy pool has been initialized.
-
-The @code{getentropy} function can fail with several errors, some of
-which are listed below.
+This function writes exactly @var{length} bytes of random data to the
+array starting at @var{buffer}.  @var{length} can be no more than 256.
+On success, it returns zero.  On failure, it returns @math{-1}, and
+@code{errno} is set to indicate the problem.  Some of the possible
+errors are listed below.
 
 @table @code
 @item ENOSYS
-The kernel does not implement the required system call.
+The operating system does not implement a randomness source, or does
+not support this way of accessing it.  (For instance, the system call
+used by this function was added to the Linux kernel in version 3.17.)
 
 @item EFAULT
 The combination of @var{buffer} and @var{length} arguments specifies
 an invalid memory range.
 
 @item EIO
-More than 256 bytes of randomness have been requested, or the buffer
-could not be overwritten with random data for an unspecified reason.
-
+@var{length} is larger than 256, or the kernel entropy pool has
+suffered a catastrophic failure.
 @end table
 
+A call to @code{getentropy} can only block when the system has just
+booted and the randomness source has not yet been initialized.
+However, if it does block, it cannot be interrupted by signals or
+thread cancellation.  Programs intended to run in very early stages of
+the boot process may need to use @code{getrandom} in non-blocking mode
+instead, and be prepared to cope with random data not being available
+at all.
+
+The @code{getentropy} function is declared in the header file
+@file{sys/random.h}.  It is derived from OpenBSD.
 @end deftypefun
 
 @deftypefun ssize_t getrandom (void *@var{buffer}, size_t @var{length}, unsigned int @var{flags})
 @standards{GNU, sys/random.h}
 @safety{@mtsafe{}@assafe{}@acsafe{}}
 
-This function writes @var{length} bytes of random data to the array
-starting at @var{buffer}.  On success, this function returns the number
-of bytes which have been written to the buffer (which can be less than
-@var{length}).  On error, @code{-1} is returned, and @code{errno} is
-updated accordingly.
-
-The @code{getrandom} function is declared in the header file
-@file{sys/random.h}.  It is a GNU extension.
-
-The following flags are defined for the @var{flags} argument:
+This function writes up to @var{length} bytes of random data to the
+array starting at @var{buffer}.  The @var{flags} argument should be
+either zero, or the bitwise OR of some of the following flags:
 
 @table @code
 @item GRND_RANDOM
-Use the @file{/dev/random} (blocking) pool instead of the
-@file{/dev/urandom} (non-blocking) pool to obtain randomness.  If the
-@code{GRND_RANDOM} flag is specified, the @code{getrandom} function can
-block even after the randomness source has been initialized.
+Use the @file{/dev/random} (blocking) source instead of the
+@file{/dev/urandom} (non-blocking) source to obtain randomness.
+
+If this flag is specified, the call may block, potentially for quite
+some time.  If it is not specified, the call can only block when the
+system has just booted and the randomness source has not yet been
+initialized.
 
 @item GRND_NONBLOCK
 Instead of blocking, return to the caller immediately if no data is
 available.
 @end table
 
-The @code{getrandom} function is a cancellation point.
+Unlike @code{getentropy}, the @code{getrandom} function is a
+cancellation point, and if it blocks, it can be interrupted by
+signals.
 
-Obtaining randomness from the @file{/dev/urandom} pool (i.e., a call
-without the @code{GRND_RANDOM} flag) can block if the system has just
-booted and the pool has not yet been initialized.
-
-The @code{getrandom} function can fail with several errors, some of
-which are listed below.  In addition, the function may not fill the
-buffer completely and return a value less than @var{length}.
+On success, @code{getrandom} returns the number of bytes which have
+been written to the buffer, which may be less than @var{length}.  On
+error, it returns @math{-1}, and @code{errno} is set to indicate the
+problem.  Some of the possible errors are:
 
 @table @code
 @item ENOSYS
-The kernel does not implement the @code{getrandom} system call.
+The operating system does not implement a randomness source, or does
+not support this way of accessing it.  (For instance, the system call
+used by this function was added to the Linux kernel in version 3.17.)
 
 @item EAGAIN
 No random data was available and @code{GRND_NONBLOCK} was specified in
@@ -228,4 +334,7 @@  the kernel randomness pool is initialized, this can happen even if
 The @var{flags} argument contains an invalid combination of flags.
 @end table
 
+The @code{getrandom} function is declared in the header file
+@file{sys/random.h}.  It is a GNU extension.
+
 @end deftypefun
diff --git a/manual/examples/genpass.c b/manual/examples/genpass.c
index 5edb2e9b8a..23d20789fc 100644
--- a/manual/examples/genpass.c
+++ b/manual/examples/genpass.c
@@ -16,34 +16,44 @@ 
 */
 
 #include <stdio.h>
-#include <time.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
 #include <crypt.h>
 
 int
 main(void)
 {
-  unsigned long seed[2];
-  char salt[] = "$1$........";
-  const char *const seedchars =
+  unsigned char ubytes[16];
+  char salt[20];
+  const char *const saltchars =
     "./0123456789ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRST"
     "UVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz";
-  char *password;
+  char *hash;
   int i;
 
-  /* Generate a (not very) random seed.
-     You should do it better than this...  */
-  seed[0] = time(NULL);
-  seed[1] = getpid() ^ (seed[0] >> 14 & 0x30000);
-
-  /* Turn it into printable characters from `seedchars'.  */
-  for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
-    salt[3+i] = seedchars[(seed[i/5] >> (i%5)*6) & 0x3f];
-
-  /* Read in the user's password and encrypt it.  */
-  password = crypt(getpass("Password:"), salt);
+  /* Retrieve 16 unpredictable bytes from the operating system.  */
+  if (getentropy (ubytes, sizeof ubytes))
+    {
+      perror ("getentropy");
+      return 1;
+    }
+
+  /* Use them to fill in the salt string.  */
+  salt[0] = '$';
+  salt[1] = '5'; /* SHA-256 */
+  salt[2] = '$';
+  for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+    salt[3+i] = saltchars[ubytes[i] & 0x3f];
+  salt[3+i] = '\0';
+
+  /* Read in the user's passphrase and hash it.  */
+  hash = crypt (getpass ("Enter new passphrase: "), salt);
+  if (!hash || hash[0] == '*')
+    {
+      perror ("crypt");
+      return 1;
+    }
 
   /* Print the results.  */
-  puts(password);
+  puts (hash);
   return 0;
 }
diff --git a/manual/examples/mygetpass.c b/manual/examples/mygetpass.c
index dfc0c59a7f..13569b327a 100644
--- a/manual/examples/mygetpass.c
+++ b/manual/examples/mygetpass.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ 
-/* Reading Passwords
+/* Reading Passphrases Manually
    Copyright (C) 1991-2018 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
 
    This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@  my_getpass (char **lineptr, size_t *n, FILE *stream)
   if (tcsetattr (fileno (stream), TCSAFLUSH, &new) != 0)
     return -1;
 
-  /* Read the password.  */
+  /* Read the passphrase  */
   nread = getline (lineptr, n, stream);
 
   /* Restore terminal.  */
diff --git a/manual/examples/testpass.c b/manual/examples/testpass.c
index 19f1ae7de0..f8883fea17 100644
--- a/manual/examples/testpass.c
+++ b/manual/examples/testpass.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ 
-/* Verify a password.
+/* Verify a passphrase.
    Copyright (C) 1991-2018 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
 
    This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
@@ -20,24 +20,48 @@ 
 #include <unistd.h>
 #include <crypt.h>
 
+/* @samp{GNU's Not Unix} hashed using SHA-256, MD5, and DES.  */
+static const char hash_sha[] =
+  "$5$DQ2z5NHf1jNJnChB$kV3ZTR0aUaosujPhLzR84Llo3BsspNSe4/tsp7VoEn6";
+static const char hash_md5[] = "$1$A3TxDv41$rtXVTUXl2LkeSV0UU5xxs1";
+static const char hash_des[] = "FgkTuF98w5DaI";
+
 int
 main(void)
 {
-  /* Hashed form of "GNU libc manual".  */
-  const char *const pass = "$1$/iSaq7rB$EoUw5jJPPvAPECNaaWzMK/";
+  char *phrase;
+  int status = 0;
+
+  /* Prompt for a passphrase.  */
+  phrase = getpass ("Enter passphrase: ");
+
+  /* Compare against the stored hashes.  Any input that begins with
+     @samp{GNU's No} will match the DES hash, but the other two will
+     only match @samp{GNU's Not Unix}.  */
 
-  char *result;
-  int ok;
+  if (strcmp (crypt (phrase, hash_sha), hash_sha))
+    {
+      puts ("SHA: not ok");
+      status = 1;
+    }
+  else
+    puts ("SHA: ok");
 
-/*@group*/
-  /* Read in the user's password and encrypt it,
-     passing the expected password in as the salt.  */
-  result = crypt(getpass("Password:"), pass);
-/*@end group*/
+  if (strcmp (crypt (phrase, hash_md5), hash_md5))
+    {
+      puts ("MD5: not ok");
+      status = 1;
+    }
+  else
+    puts ("MD5: ok");
 
-  /* Test the result.  */
-  ok = strcmp (result, pass) == 0;
+  if (strcmp (crypt (phrase, hash_des), hash_des))
+    {
+      puts ("DES: not ok");
+      status = 1;
+    }
+  else
+    puts ("DES: ok");
 
-  puts(ok ? "Access granted." : "Access denied.");
-  return ok ? 0 : 1;
+  return status;
 }
diff --git a/manual/intro.texi b/manual/intro.texi
index cc9c99f543..779fec8f3d 100644
--- a/manual/intro.texi
+++ b/manual/intro.texi
@@ -1321,7 +1321,6 @@  this manual.
 @c Message Translation (8)
 @c Resource Usage And Limitations (22)
 @c Inter-Process Communication (27)
-@c DES Encryption and Password Handling (33)
 @c Debugging support (34)
 @c POSIX Threads (35)
 @c Internal Probes (36)
diff --git a/manual/memory.texi b/manual/memory.texi
index b95f6aa1b9..3fa56569c4 100644
--- a/manual/memory.texi
+++ b/manual/memory.texi
@@ -3452,7 +3452,7 @@  system performance.  In this case, locking pages can help.
 @item
 Privacy.  If you keep secrets in virtual memory and that virtual memory
 gets paged out, that increases the chance that the secrets will get out.
-If a password gets written out to disk swap space, for example, it might
+If a passphrase gets written out to disk swap space, for example, it might
 still be there long after virtual and real memory have been wiped clean.
 
 @end itemize
diff --git a/manual/nss.texi b/manual/nss.texi
index d534c260d3..18361b6f42 100644
--- a/manual/nss.texi
+++ b/manual/nss.texi
@@ -84,15 +84,15 @@  Network names and numbers, @pxref{Networks Database}.
 @item protocols
 Network protocols, @pxref{Protocols Database}.
 @item passwd
-User passwords, @pxref{User Database}.
+User identities, @pxref{User Database}.
 @item rpc
-Remote procedure call names and numbers,
+Remote procedure call names and numbers.
 @comment @pxref{RPC Database}.
 @item services
 Network services, @pxref{Services Database}.
 @item shadow
-Shadow user passwords,
-@comment @pxref{Shadow Password Database}.
+User passphrase hashes and related information.
+@comment @pxref{Shadow Passphrase Database}.
 @end table
 
 @noindent
@@ -526,7 +526,7 @@  with the main application.)
 The @code{get@var{XXX}by@var{YYY}} functions are the most important
 functions in the NSS modules.  But there are others which implement
 the other ways to access system databases (say for the
-password database, there are @code{setpwent}, @code{getpwent}, and
+user database, there are @code{setpwent}, @code{getpwent}, and
 @code{endpwent}).  These will be described in more detail later.
 Here we give a general way to determine the
 signature of the module function:
@@ -650,7 +650,7 @@  general rules must be followed by all functions.
 In fact there are four kinds of different functions which may appear in
 the interface.  All derive from the traditional ones for system databases.
 @var{db} in the following table is normally an abbreviation for the
-database (e.g., it is @code{pw} for the password database).
+database (e.g., it is @code{pw} for the user database).
 
 @table @code
 @item enum nss_status _nss_@var{database}_set@var{db}ent (void)
diff --git a/manual/socket.texi b/manual/socket.texi
index 79eb4208be..a6c44b77c3 100644
--- a/manual/socket.texi
+++ b/manual/socket.texi
@@ -257,7 +257,7 @@  system assigns an address automatically if you have not specified one.
 
 Occasionally a client needs to specify an address because the server
 discriminates based on address; for example, the rsh and rlogin
-protocols look at the client's socket address and only bypass password
+protocols look at the client's socket address and only bypass passphrase
 checking if it is less than @code{IPPORT_RESERVED} (@pxref{Ports}).
 
 The details of socket addresses vary depending on what namespace you are
@@ -3277,7 +3277,7 @@  or request that comes in.  If @var{style} uses connections, then
 @var{user} is the user name that the server should run as.  @code{inetd} runs
 as root, so it can set the user ID of its children arbitrarily.  It's
 best to avoid using @samp{root} for @var{user} if you can; but some
-servers, such as Telnet and FTP, read a username and password
+servers, such as Telnet and FTP, read a username and passphrase
 themselves.  These servers need to be root initially so they can log
 in as commanded by the data coming over the network.
 
diff --git a/manual/terminal.texi b/manual/terminal.texi
index 0b275fc002..d830baacd7 100644
--- a/manual/terminal.texi
+++ b/manual/terminal.texi
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@  descriptor is and how to open a file descriptor for a terminal device.
 * Line Control::                Sending break sequences, clearing
                                  terminal buffers @dots{}
 * Noncanon Example::            How to read single characters without echo.
-* getpass::                     Prompting the user for a password.
+* getpass::                     Prompting the user for a passphrase.
 * Pseudo-Terminals::            How to open a pseudo-terminal.
 @end menu
 
@@ -1873,9 +1873,9 @@  handlers for job control signals that reset terminal modes.  The above
 example does so.
 
 @node getpass
-@section Reading Passwords
+@section Reading Passphrases
 
-When reading in a password, it is desirable to avoid displaying it on
+When reading in a passphrase, it is desirable to avoid displaying it on
 the screen, to help keep it secret.  The following function handles this
 in a convenient way.
 
@@ -1884,7 +1884,7 @@  in a convenient way.
 @safety{@prelim{}@mtunsafe{@mtasuterm{}}@asunsafe{@ascuheap{} @asulock{} @asucorrupt{}}@acunsafe{@acuterm{} @aculock{} @acucorrupt{}}}
 @c This function will attempt to create a stream for terminal I/O, but
 @c will fallback to stdio/stderr.  It attempts to change the terminal
-@c mode in a thread-unsafe way, write out the prompt, read the password,
+@c mode in a thread-unsafe way, write out the prompt, read the passphrase,
 @c then restore the terminal mode.  It has a cleanup to close the stream
 @c in case of (synchronous) cancellation, but not to restore the
 @c terminal mode.
@@ -1892,14 +1892,14 @@  in a convenient way.
 @code{getpass} outputs @var{prompt}, then reads a string in from the
 terminal without echoing it.  It tries to connect to the real terminal,
 @file{/dev/tty}, if possible, to encourage users not to put plaintext
-passwords in files; otherwise, it uses @code{stdin} and @code{stderr}.
+passphrases in files; otherwise, it uses @code{stdin} and @code{stderr}.
 @code{getpass} also disables the INTR, QUIT, and SUSP characters on the
 terminal using the @code{ISIG} terminal attribute (@pxref{Local Modes}).
 The terminal is flushed before and after @code{getpass}, so that
-characters of a mistyped password are not accidentally visible.
+characters of a mistyped passphrase are not accidentally visible.
 
 In other C libraries, @code{getpass} may only return the first
-@code{PASS_MAX} bytes of a password.  @Theglibc{} has no limit, so
+@code{PASS_MAX} bytes of a passphrase.  @Theglibc{} has no limit, so
 @code{PASS_MAX} is undefined.
 
 The prototype for this function is in @file{unistd.h}.  @code{PASS_MAX}
diff --git a/manual/users.texi b/manual/users.texi
index 8690b65633..242f0aea0e 100644
--- a/manual/users.texi
+++ b/manual/users.texi
@@ -1722,7 +1722,6 @@  members.  Older systems do not even have the @code{ut_host} member.
 @node User Database
 @section User Database
 @cindex user database
-@cindex password database
 @pindex /etc/passwd
 
 This section describes how to search and scan the database of registered
@@ -1730,6 +1729,16 @@  users.  The database itself is kept in the file @file{/etc/passwd} on
 most systems, but on some systems a special network server gives access
 to it.
 
+Historically, this database included one-way hashes of user
+passphrases (@pxref{Passphrase Storage}) as well as public information
+about each user (such as their user ID and full name).  Many of the
+functions and data structures associated with this database, and the
+filename @file{/etc/passwd} itself, reflect this history.  However,
+the information in this database is available to all users, and it is
+no longer considered safe to make passphrase hashes available to all
+users, so they have been moved to a ``shadow'' database that can only
+be accessed with special privileges.
+
 @menu
 * User Data Structure::         What each user record contains.
 * Lookup User::                 How to look for a particular user.
@@ -1753,8 +1762,10 @@  entries in the system user data base.  It has at least the following members:
 @item char *pw_name
 The user's login name.
 
-@item char *pw_passwd.
-The encrypted password string.
+@item char *pw_passwd
+Historically, this field would hold the one-way hash of the user's
+passphrase.  Nowadays, it will almost always be the single character
+@samp{x}, indicating that the hash is in the shadow database.
 
 @item uid_t pw_uid
 The user ID number.
@@ -2105,7 +2116,7 @@  rewritten on subsequent calls to @code{fgetpwent}.  You must copy the
 contents of the structure if you wish to save the information.
 
 The stream must correspond to a file in the same format as the standard
-password database file.
+user database file.
 @end deftypefun
 
 @deftypefun int fgetpwent_r (FILE *@var{stream}, struct passwd *@var{result_buf}, char *@var{buffer}, size_t @var{buflen}, struct passwd **@var{result})
@@ -2126,7 +2137,7 @@  first @var{buflen} bytes of the additional buffer pointed to by
 strings which are pointed to by the elements of the result structure.
 
 The stream must correspond to a file in the same format as the standard
-password database file.
+user database file.
 
 If the function returns zero @var{result} points to the structure with
 the wanted data (normally this is in @var{result_buf}).  If errors
@@ -2234,7 +2245,6 @@  avoid using it, because it makes sense only on the assumption that the
 on a system which merges the traditional Unix data base with other
 extended information about users, adding an entry using this function
 would inevitably leave out much of the important information.
-@c Then how are programmers to modify the password file? -zw
 
 The group and user ID fields are left empty if the group or user name
 starts with a - or +.
diff --git a/nscd/pwdcache.c b/nscd/pwdcache.c
index 997d7c08fc..96ba46345a 100644
--- a/nscd/pwdcache.c
+++ b/nscd/pwdcache.c
@@ -405,9 +405,9 @@  addpwbyX (struct database_dyn *db, int fd, request_header *req,
   if (__glibc_unlikely (debug_level > 0))
     {
       if (he == NULL)
-	dbg_log (_("Haven't found \"%s\" in password cache!"), keystr);
+	dbg_log (_("Haven't found \"%s\" in user database cache!"), keystr);
       else
-	dbg_log (_("Reloading \"%s\" in password cache!"), keystr);
+	dbg_log (_("Reloading \"%s\" in user database cache!"), keystr);
     }
 
   while (lookup (req->type, key, &resultbuf, buffer, buflen, &pwd) != 0
diff --git a/posix/unistd.h b/posix/unistd.h
index 5c3da702b6..9b30f553d7 100644
--- a/posix/unistd.h
+++ b/posix/unistd.h
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@  __BEGIN_DECLS
 /* The X/Open Unix extensions are available.  */
 #define _XOPEN_UNIX	1
 
-/* Encryption is present.  */
+/* One-way hashing of passphrases is available.  */
 #define	_XOPEN_CRYPT	1
 
 /* The enhanced internationalization capabilities according to XPG4.2
@@ -1119,8 +1119,12 @@  extern int fdatasync (int __fildes);
 #endif /* Use POSIX199309 */
 
 #ifdef	__USE_XOPEN
-/* Encrypt at most 8 characters from KEY using salt to perturb DES.  */
-extern char *crypt (const char *__key, const char *__salt)
+/* One-way hash PHRASE, returning a string suitable for storage in the
+   user database.  SALT selects the one-way function to use, and
+   ensures that no two users' hashes are the same, even if they use
+   the same passphrase.  The return value points to static storage
+   which will be overwritten by the next call to crypt.  */
+extern char *crypt (const char *__phrase, const char *__salt)
      __THROW __nonnull ((1, 2));
 
 /* Swab pairs bytes in the first N bytes of the area pointed to by
diff --git a/pwd/pwd.h b/pwd/pwd.h
index 25c6b97551..e6d20cd78b 100644
--- a/pwd/pwd.h
+++ b/pwd/pwd.h
@@ -45,11 +45,12 @@  typedef __uid_t uid_t;
 # endif
 #endif
 
-/* The passwd structure.  */
+/* A record in the user database.  */
 struct passwd
 {
   char *pw_name;		/* Username.  */
-  char *pw_passwd;		/* Password.  */
+  char *pw_passwd;		/* Hashed passphrase, if shadow database
+                                   not in use (see shadow.h).  */
   __uid_t pw_uid;		/* User ID.  */
   __gid_t pw_gid;		/* Group ID.  */
   char *pw_gecos;		/* Real name.  */
@@ -64,19 +65,19 @@  struct passwd
 
 
 #if defined __USE_MISC || defined __USE_XOPEN_EXTENDED
-/* Rewind the password-file stream.
+/* Rewind the user database stream.
 
    This function is a possible cancellation point and therefore not
    marked with __THROW.  */
 extern void setpwent (void);
 
-/* Close the password-file stream.
+/* Close the user database stream.
 
    This function is a possible cancellation point and therefore not
    marked with __THROW.  */
 extern void endpwent (void);
 
-/* Read an entry from the password-file stream, opening it if necessary.
+/* Read an entry from the user database stream, opening it if necessary.
 
    This function is a possible cancellation point and therefore not
    marked with __THROW.  */
@@ -84,7 +85,7 @@  extern struct passwd *getpwent (void);
 #endif
 
 #ifdef	__USE_MISC
-/* Read an entry from STREAM.
+/* Read a user database entry from STREAM.
 
    This function is not part of POSIX and therefore no official
    cancellation point.  But due to similarity with an POSIX interface
@@ -92,7 +93,7 @@  extern struct passwd *getpwent (void);
    therefore not marked with __THROW.  */
 extern struct passwd *fgetpwent (FILE *__stream) __nonnull ((1));
 
-/* Write the given entry onto the given stream.
+/* Write a given user database entry onto the given stream.
 
    This function is not part of POSIX and therefore no official
    cancellation point.  But due to similarity with an POSIX interface
@@ -102,13 +103,13 @@  extern int putpwent (const struct passwd *__restrict __p,
 		     FILE *__restrict __f);
 #endif
 
-/* Search for an entry with a matching user ID.
+/* Retrieve the user database entry for the given user ID.
 
    This function is a possible cancellation point and therefore not
    marked with __THROW.  */
 extern struct passwd *getpwuid (__uid_t __uid);
 
-/* Search for an entry with a matching username.
+/* Retrieve the user database entry for the given username.
 
    This function is a possible cancellation point and therefore not
    marked with __THROW.  */
@@ -155,8 +156,8 @@  extern int getpwnam_r (const char *__restrict __name,
 
 
 # ifdef	__USE_MISC
-/* Read an entry from STREAM.  This function is not standardized and
-   probably never will.
+/* Read a user database entry from STREAM.  This function is not
+   standardized and probably never will.
 
    This function is not part of POSIX and therefore no official
    cancellation point.  But due to similarity with an POSIX interface
@@ -172,9 +173,9 @@  extern int fgetpwent_r (FILE *__restrict __stream,
 #endif	/* POSIX or reentrant */
 
 #ifdef __USE_GNU
-/* Re-construct the password-file line for the given uid
-   in the given buffer.  This knows the format that the caller
-   will expect, but this need not be the format of the password file.
+/* Write a traditional /etc/passwd line, based on the user database
+   entry for the given UID, to BUFFER; space for BUFFER must be
+   allocated by the caller.
 
    This function is not part of POSIX and therefore no official
    cancellation point.  But due to similarity with an POSIX interface
diff --git a/shadow/shadow.h b/shadow/shadow.h
index 6f3a570e4b..351882e448 100644
--- a/shadow/shadow.h
+++ b/shadow/shadow.h
@@ -15,7 +15,11 @@ 
    License along with the GNU C Library; if not, see
    <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.  */
 
-/* Declaration of types and functions for shadow password suite.  */
+/* Declaration of types and functions for "shadow" storage of hashed
+   passphrases.  The shadow database is like the user database, but is
+   only accessible with special privileges, so that malicious users
+   cannot retrieve everyone else's hashed passphrase to brute-force at
+   their convenience.  */
 
 #ifndef _SHADOW_H
 #define _SHADOW_H	1
@@ -35,11 +39,11 @@ 
 
 __BEGIN_DECLS
 
-/* Structure of the password file.  */
+/* A record in the shadow database.  */
 struct spwd
   {
     char *sp_namp;		/* Login name.  */
-    char *sp_pwdp;		/* Encrypted password.  */
+    char *sp_pwdp;		/* Hashed passphrase.  */
     long int sp_lstchg;		/* Date of last change.  */
     long int sp_min;		/* Minimum number of days between changes.  */
     long int sp_max;		/* Maximum number of days between changes.  */
@@ -101,7 +105,7 @@  extern struct spwd *sgetspent (const char *__string);
    therefore not marked with __THROW.  */
 extern struct spwd *fgetspent (FILE *__stream);
 
-/* Write line containing shadow password entry to stream.
+/* Write line containing shadow entry to stream.
 
    This function is not part of POSIX and therefore no official
    cancellation point.  But due to similarity with an POSIX interface
@@ -137,10 +141,10 @@  extern int fgetspent_r (FILE *__stream, struct spwd *__result_buf,
 /* The simple locking functionality provided here is not suitable for
    multi-threaded applications.  */
 
-/* Protect password file against multi writers.  */
+/* Request exclusive access to /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow.  */
 extern int lckpwdf (void) __THROW;
 
-/* Unlock password file.  */
+/* Release exclusive access to /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow.  */
 extern int ulckpwdf (void) __THROW;
 
 __END_DECLS